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Abstract: This letter is the reply to: Remarks on Peinado et al.’s Analysis of J3Gen by
J. Garcia-Alfaro, J. Herrera-Joancomartí and J. Melià-Seguí published in Sensors 2015, 15,
6217–6220. Peinado et al. cryptanalyzed the pseudorandom number generator proposed by
Melià-Seguí et al., describing two possible attacks. Later, Garcia-Alfaro claimed that one of
this attack did not hold in practice because the assumptions made by Peinado et al. were not
correct. This letter reviews those remarks, showing that J3Gen is anyway flawed and that,
without further information, the interpretation made by Peinado et al. seems to be correct.
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1. Introduction
The letter by Garcia-Alfaro et al. [1] claims that the deterministic attack carried out by
Peinado et al. [2] against the J3Gen PRNG (Pseudo Random Number Generator) [3,4] is not correct and
seems to conclude that it is still secure. If a clear technical description is always required for a system,
this becomes crucial when we talk about cryptographic proposals. More in particular, a cryptographic
system should clearly specify the implementation, the range of possible parameters and the security
claims for those ranges of parameters. The letter by Garcia-Alfaro et al. not only does not clarify
some aspects that remained unclear in the original paper but it adds more doubts about the design and
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the results achieved with the J3Gen generator. This letter reviews such attacks and the remarks made by
Garcia-Alfaro et al. to try to determine the security level eventually provided by J3Gen and its suitability
for cryptographic purposes.
2. Concerning the Probabilistic Attack
Peinado et al. [2] presented two attacks: a probabilistic attack, based on solving linear equation
systems, and a deterministic attack, based on a decimation of the output sequence. As the authors of [1]
do not object anything about the former attack, one can assume that the probabilistic attacks is correct
and therefore that the design of J3Gen is anyway flawed. When this probabilistic attack is applied to the
set of parameters of the example described by the authors in [3], n = 16, m = 8 and l = 15, it only
requires 240 intercepted bits to recover, on average, 7.6 of the 8 polynomials, which are supposed to be
the secret information. Similarly, for other set of parameters given by the authors in [3], n = 32,m = 16
and l = 31, it shows that 528 output bits could be enough to recover all of the 16 feedback polynomials,
and that an adversary with an output sequence of 1152 bits is able to recover all of these polynomials
in half of the cases. Surprisingly, this attack is not mentioned in the letter [1] and the authors simply
say that “the closer the value of l to n, the lower the security of J3Gen to brute force attacks”. It is
true that this hinders attacks based on solving linear equations (Massey-Berlekamp analysis [5]), as the
probabilistic attack does, but it would have been desirable that the letter of the authors quantified these
vulnerabilities since, obviously, the results given above are not acceptable for a system intended for
security purposes. On the other hand, the term “brute force attack” is usually employed for exhaustive
attacks that search for a match with every possible key of the key space, and therefore its use here to
refer to this kind of attacks is not very appropriate.
3. Concerning the Deterministic Attack
In [1], Garcia-Alfaro et al. object that the determinist attack is incorrect because Peinado et al.
in [2] misinterpreted the description of the J3Gen. However, they do not provide any consistent evidence
of this statement. In fact, the two main arguments that the authors use to claim that the attack is not
correct are:
1. “The list of polynomials (no matter the value of l) would never be applied as suggested in [2]”.
2. “The value l = 1 is not feasible in practice”.
but both of them seem to be refuted if we review what Melià-Seguí et al. wrote about the application of
the feedback polynomials and the security analysis of the parameter l.
• Section 3 of [3] provides, according to the authors, a detailed step by step sample execution of the
scheme for the generation of 32 output bits with n = 16,m = 8 and l = 15. It explains (sic): “The
system starts with p(x)1 and outputs l = 15 bits until the TRNG module transfers a bit with value
r0 = 0 to the Decoding Logic module. Then, a consecutive (but different) feedback polynomial is
selected in the Polynomial Selector module, that is, p2(x). This generates the next l = 15 LFSR
shifts with p2(x) until the next trn is obtained. The trn value for this PRNG update is r1 = 1,
hence, the Decoding Logic rotates the Polynomial Selector one position at shift 31, and another
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position at shift 32. Then, p2(x) is used 14 cycles, p3(x) is used one cycle, and p4(x) is used one
cycle in this PRNG update and 14 cycles in the next PRNG update”.
We try to capture this with Figure 1 and Table 1 compares the case l = 15, described above, and
l = 1, assumed by Peinado et al. Interpretation of Peinado et al. seems to be consistent: polynomials
are applied sequentially, generating 1 or l bits, and as a consequence, trn does not have any effect when
l = 1.
l=15
r0 = 0 r1 = 1
p1 (x) p2 (x) p4 (x) 
16-bit Pseudo Random Number 1 16-bit Pseudo Random Number 2 16-bit Pseudo Random Number 2
p3 (x) 
Figure 1. Generation of two random numbers in J3Gen.
Table 1. Application of Primitive Feedback Polynomials in J3Gen.
l=15 l=1
trn Polynomial Action trn Polynomial Action
p1(x) Generate 15 (=l) bits p1(x) Generate 1 (=l) bits
0 0
p2(x) Generate 15 (=l) bits p2(x) Generate 1 (=l) bits
1 1
p3(x) Generate 1 bit p3(x) Generate 1 bit
p4(x) Generate 15 (=l) bit p4(x) Generate 1 (=l) bit
• Melià-Seguí et al. [1] claim that “the clock signals controlling J3Gen (i.e., the LFSR clock, as
well as the clock of the physical source of randomness, and the one controlling the selection of
polynomials) are not synchronized”. We can understand that activation and deactivation timings
can be different but all of them should be controlled by the same single master clock. EPCGen2
tags do not have on-board clocks and they recover the clock signal from the reader’s carrier. The
presence therefore of three independent clock signals requires further explanations.
• In their letter [1], the deterministic attack is said not to be feasible in practice because the value
l = 1 is only given as a boundary and in this case J3Gen could simply output the true random
sequences from the thermal-noise generator. We cannot say that the authors did not have this in
mind when they described J3Gen, but at leat, it does not seem to coincide with that written in the
original papers where the value l = 1 is not only included in the analysis, but also suggested to
increase the security of the system. In particular, it says “Depending on the level of desired security,
l can be bounded by 1 ≤ l < n”, and follows “Here, the attacker has to face with the uncertainty
added by the feedback update rate (l). For example, using the selected parameters n = 32 and
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m = 16, if l = 31 it means there would be up to 4 possible solutions for each system of equations.
If l = 25 then the possible solutions are up to 16,384, for l = 21 the possible solutions increase
to 4,194,304, etc. The extreme case would be l = 1 where all 67 million primitive feedback
polynomials would be equally probable". Thus, if the authors thought that the value l = 1 could
not be applied by practical reasons, they should have clarified the complete range of values that
should be excluded by practical reasons (in the letter the authors say that it is explained in previous
papers but we have not found any reference to this).
4. Additional Remarks
The doubts about the J3Gen generator do not stop with the implementation and the range of values,
but also the provided statistical tests should be reviewed. Firstly, because the attacks described by
Peinado et al. and even the dependence of these with the parameters, later recognized by the own
authors (l must be not close to n), have not been taken into account. Secondly, because this statistical
tests do not seem to be correct. For example, in [4] (Section 5.1 ) the authors say to conduct ten tests,
running 1000 iterations per test to show (due to a misinterpretation of the EPC Gen2 standard) that the
probability that any two tags simultaneously generate identical 16-bit sequence for a population up to
10,000 tags is lower than 0.04. This cannot be correct because for true random sequences of 16 bits, this
probability of collision can be computed as P = 1− probnocollision where:
probnocollision = 1×
(
1− 1
216
)
×
(
1− 2
216
)
× . . .
×
(
1− 9999
216
)
= 1.4822 · 10−323. (1)
In fact, it can be further computed by using the following approximation (birthday paradox [6]):
n =
√
− ln(1− P ) · 217 (2)
that the number of sequences (n) required to have a probability of collision higher than 0.04 is just 74.
5. Conclusions
In conclusion, we regret that Garcia-Alfaro et al. did not use their letter to:
• clarify the aspects above mentioned,
• describe new examples of generation of random numbers that justify their arguments,
• provide clear secure ranges for the parameters of the protocol since low values of l are not practical,
• review all the security claims.
Without this, the use of J3Gen for cryptographic purposes remains highly inadvisable.
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